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The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, and Other Fun 
Facts (Plus a Few Random Academic Speculations) about Counting Electoral Votes 
Jack Beermann and Gary Lawson* 
Abstract: In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 
presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes.  In short, 
every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice 
President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and 
count the votes contained therein.  The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, 
and thus, the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by 
concurrent resolution, to reject a state’s electoral votes, is unconstitutional.  Further, the 
objections raised to two states’ electoral votes on January 6, 2021, were not proper within the 
terms of the Act, and therefore, even if Congress has the power specified in the Act, 
congressional action rejecting states’ electoral votes would have been contrary to law.  While 
state executive or state judicially-ordered departures from the requirements of state election 
laws in presidential elections might violate the federal Constitution’s requirement that electors 
be chosen as specified by state legislatures, determining whether this has taken place is much 
more complicated than simply examining the language of state election statutes.  We suggest that 
making this determination requires a careful examination of state interpretation traditions that 
we decline to undertake in this brief essay on the constitutional process for counting electoral 
votes. 
                                                          
* © 2021, all rights reserved. 
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On January 6, 2021, the President of the Senate (Vice-President Mike Pence), presiding 
over an assemblage of the House and Senate1, received electoral vote certificates from the fifty 
States and the District of Columbia.  At that point, he should have opened the certificates, and, 
after confirmation that the proper certifications were present, the electoral votes contained 
therein should have been counted. Nothing more.  The entire process should have been over in 
thirty short minutes.  
Instead, the process stretched into the early morning hours of January 7 after nearly nine 
hours of debate and delay.  None of that debate and delay, as far as we can tell, involved the 
authenticity of the certifications, the identity of the candidates for whom the electoral votes were 
cast, basic arithmetic, or anything else concerning the reading and counting of votes contained in 
the certificates. 
The causes of the lengthening of the process were two.   First, Vice President Pence, 
applying the Electoral Count Act of 1887, allowed Members of Congress to object to the 
certificates from Arizona and Pennsylvania, which triggered the Act’s requirement that the 
House and Senate separate and, after a maximum of two hours of debate, vote separately on 
whether to reject each certificate.2  This despite the facts that a vote to sustain either objection 
would have been illegal under the Act and that, regardless of compliance with the Act, treating as 
                                                          
1   We use the somewhat awkward phrase “assemblage of the House and Senate” rather than the seemingly more 
natural phrase “joint session of Congress” because it is far from clear that the meeting of officials prescribed by the 
Twelfth Amendment is actually a joint session of Congress.  See John Harrison, Nobody for President, 16 J. L. & 
POL. 699, 703 n.13 (2000) (“The Twelfth Amendment does not call the meeting that it contemplates a joint session. 
It says that the President of the Senate shall open the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.”); Chris Land & David Schultz, On the Unenforceability of the Electoral Count Act, 13 RUTGERS 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 340 (2016). 
 
2   Major brownie points for prescience must go to Ned Foley for predicting, with almost scary accuracy, this course 
of events.  See Edward B. Foley, Preparing for a Disputed Presidential Election: An Exercise in Election Risk 
Assessment and Management, 51 LOYOLA U. CHIC. L. REV. 309 (2019). 
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legally binding a concurrent resolution of Congress rejecting a certificate would be 
unconstitutional under the Twelfth Amendment.  While the Twelfth Amendment is strangely 
silent about who actually counts the votes in the certificates, the action prescribed in the 
amendment is counting, not judging.  And although it may be appropriate for the Vice President 
to seek  advice from the assembled representatives on whether a document delivered by a State is 
actually among the “certificates” that must be opened, the decision of whether to include a 
document as a “certificate[]”is committed to the discretion of the Vice President -- subject, we 
believe, to judicial review. 
 Second, in the middle of the debate over the first contested certificate, from Arizona, 
protestors stormed the Capitol building, somehow breaching what, in light of information 
available to law enforcement well in advance of January 6, one would have thought would have 
been tight security.   The proceedings halted for nearly six hours while the authorities regained 
control over the building and determined it was safe for the Vice President, the Members of 
Congress, and their staffs to return and resume the count.  Unfortunately, one protestor was shot 
and killed by police as she attempted to enter the Capitol building, a Capitol Police officer died 
from causes yet to be determined, and three more members of the crowd outside the Capitol died 
after suffering medical emergencies.  The saddest fact is that the process should have been over 
before the shooting occurred, and the protestors should have been informed that there was no 
legal or constitutional path to having Members of Congress reject any certificate, which might 
have dampened their ardor for attacking the process.3 
                                                          
3   Or perhaps not.  Such a notification might have had the opposite effect.  If the protestors believed that they were 
resisting an attempt fraudulently to take over the government , and they were told that there was no legal method to 
prevent that takeover, it might have prompted even more vigorous action.  But to the extent that the protests were 
grounded in constitutionalist rather than extra-constitutional revolutionary sentiment, accurate information about the 
Constitution and the constitutional functions of Members of Congress might have been helpful in that particular 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3795421
4 
In this essay we explain, as clearly and simply as possible, the constitutional process for 
tabulating electoral votes for President and Vice President as mandated by the Twelfth 
Amendment.  We explain that the only constitutional role plausibly attributable to Members of 
Congress in the tabulation process is the arithmetic counting of votes in certificates opened by 
the Vice President. It is not at all clear that those Members are even the appropriate vote 
counters, but they are at least textually possible candidates for that role. Quite possibly they have 
no role at all.  While their physical presence during the vote-counting process is necessary 
because if no slate receives a majority of the votes represented by the certificates, the 
Constitution requires the House and Senate to elect a President and Vice President, respectively, 
they are but mere witnesses to the Vice President’s opening of the certificates.4 
We also explain as a statutory matter that when, as was the case in the procedure arising 
out of the 2020 presidential election, only one certificate has been provided by a State, the text of 
the Electoral Count Act specifies that the only legal objection to a certificate that Congress may 
accept is that it was not provided in the proper form and manner by the appropriate authority of 
the State according to state law.  (This reading of the text is also consistent with the Act’s 
historical context.)  In such a situation, the Act provides that each House of Congress debates 
and votes on the objection, and if both Houses agree, the Vice President may not include the 
votes represented by that certificate in the tally of the vote for President and Vice President.  If 
enough votes are rejected, this could deprive the apparent winner of the election of a majority of 
electoral votes, which would throw the presidential election to the House of Representatives for a 
                                                          
moment.  It is unclear whether any protestor brought a firearm into the Capitol building, leaving some reason to 
think that good constitutional advice might have been effective rather than incendiary. 
 
4   And their presence may thereby provide some measure of public authentication of the Vice President’s actions in 
opening the certificates.  See Harrison, supra note 1, at 705. 
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process in which each State has one vote.  In 2021, this might have resulted in the re-election of 
Donald Trump because a clear majority of States have Republican-majority delegations in the 
House. 
However, even if enough States had provided statutorily objectionable certificates to 
deny Joe Biden an electoral majority, we explain that it would be unconstitutional for the 
assembled House and Senate to reject certificates for any reason, even a reason covered by the 
Act.  Insofar as the Act assigns to Congress even this limited role for consideration of objections, 
it is unconstitutional.  In our view, the Constitution requires that votes submitted by state electors 
be counted.  If there is a genuine dispute over the validity of a certificate, for example if two 
certificates arrive from a single State or if there are facts suggesting that a certificate delivered to 
the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President) was not actually sent by a state’s 
electors, the Constitution commits the determination of the certificates to the Vice President, 
subject to challenge in federal court by a candidate who is denied the Presidency or Vice 
Presidency due to the Vice President’s decision.  Any other process would violate the Twelfth 
Amendment. 
We are faced with an additional constitutional puzzle.  Article II, section 1 of the 
Constitution requires States to appoint presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct.”5  One of the claims voiced by the objectors to 2020 electoral certificates is 
that state executive authorities, with agreement in some cases by state courts, altered the process 
for conducting the election without authority from the legislature.  Some of these changes may, 
by virtue of this language from Article II, constitute federal constitutional violations, so that 
                                                          
5   U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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persons claiming to be electors as a result of those processes may not be “electors” as defined by 
the Constitution.  Determining whether this was so for any State in 2020 would require a careful 
analysis of state statutes and state traditions concerning the proper roles of executive officials 
and statutory interpretation in the state courts.  This is a complex task that cannot necessarily be 
carried out simply by a “plain meaning” scrutiny of each State’s statutes.  After all, the 
Constitution says that electors must be appointed in the “Manner” directed by the legislature.  It 
does not say what that “Manner” must be or how one must go about ascertaining the legislature’s 
directions regarding that “Manner.”  Perhaps a public-meaning textualist reading of enacted 
statutes is any given State’s prescribed means for ascertaining those legislative directions, but 
perhaps it is not; that answer could vary widely from State to State – and indeed could vary 
widely from time to time within a single State.  Happily, we do not need to conduct that analysis 
to make our fundamental point, which is that the determination of whether the selection of a 
State’s electors complies with Article I is also committed to the sole determination of the Vice 
President, subject, again to judicial review in federal court.  Congress has no constitutional role 
to play in this or any other dispute over the counting of electors, except, again, to bear witness to 
the tally and be prepared to perform its constitutionally assigned function if the Vice President’s 
count reveals that no candidate has received a majority of electoral votes. 
Many of these arguments were epically made by Vasan Kesavan two decades ago.6  We 
have little to add to his comprehensive account of the problems with the Electoral Count Act7 
                                                          
6   See (yes, all 170 pages of it) Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653 
(2002). 
 
7   We are not alone in having little to add.  See Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley, The Twelfth Amendment: A 
Constitutional Ticking Time Bomb, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 478 n.7 (2010) (noting that discussion of the Electoral 
Count Act’s constitutional defects “is brief because Vasan Kesavan has already provided a thorough analysis of the 
possible constitutional defects of the Electoral Count Act”). 
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other than its application to more recent events, the suggestion that the federal courts may have a 
larger role than Kesavan let on, and the banal observation that the rather blatant 
unconstitutionality of much of the current statutory electoral scheme remains unacknowledged. 
I. The Constitutional Vote Counting Process 
A. The Count 
The Constitution establishes clear and simple rules for counting electoral vote certificates 
provided by the States.  The Twelfth Amendment requires that state electors (not the governor, 
secretary of state or other state official) prepare a signed certificate specifying how the State’s 
electoral votes are cast and “transmit [it] sealed” to the President of the Senate.  It further 
provides that “the President of the Senate [usually the Vice-President] shall, in the presence of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be 
counted.”  Members of Congress are there as witnesses, nothing more.  The process of 
determining who is elected President and Vice-President is similarly clear and simple: “the 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number 
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed.”  What happens if no candidate wins a 
majority?  Again, clear and simple: “if no person have such majority, then from the persons 
having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President the 
House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot,  the President.”  A similar process 
is specified for selection of the Vice-President.  And now we know why the votes are counted in 
the presence of Congress—the House and Senate need to be there in case they are required to 
carry out their constitutionally prescribed function if no candidate wins a majority of electoral 
votes. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3795421
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There is, of course, a wrinkle, an ambiguity, and a lingering question lurking in this text.  
The wrinkle is that when the House selects a President, it votes by state delegation with each 
State having an equal say in the outcome.  This wrinkle will take on additional significance when 
we consider the constitutionality of the Electoral Count Act. 
The ambiguity concerns who tabulates the votes once the certificates are opened by the 
Vice President.  The language of the relevant provision is: “The President of the Senate shall, in 
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes 
shall then be counted.”  This provision leaves no doubt about who opens the certificates; that job 
belongs to the President of the Senate.  The provision does not say, however, that the President 
of the Senate shall count the votes.  It says that the votes “shall then be counted,” but it says 
nothing about who is supposed to do the counting.  The President of the Senate is not even 
necessarily the most plausible candidate for that job, given both the text’s clear commitment of 
the certificate-opening function but not the vote-counting function to the President of the Senate 
and the structural oddity of having the President of the Senate, who is quite possibly going to be 
directly interested in the outcome of the presidential election, given control over the counting 
process.8  It is not impossible to read the Twelfth Amendment to vest the counting function in the 
President of the Senate, but it is not the only reading that immediately commends itself. 
Well, if not the President of the Senate, then who?  The only other legal actors mentioned 
in the relevant provision of the Twelfth Amendment are the members of the Senate and the 
House.  Does the joint assemblage of the Senate and House therefore count the votes?  That 
would seem to be the default answer once one rules out the President of the Senate, but the text 
                                                          
8   See Colvin & Foley, supra note --, at 481; Kesavan, supra note --, at 1705. 
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and structure of the Twelfth Amendment does not immediately suggest vesting the counting 
function in the collective body of assembled representatives (which, among other things, would 
leave unstated the mechanism by which this collective body is supposed to perform a counting 
function).  One could run a textual and structural argument similar to the one made above 
regarding the Vice President for the assembled members of the Senate and House, who are 
textually given certain functions but not explicitly assigned the counting function and who might 
well have personal and/or partisan interests in the electoral outcome, perhaps leaving one with 
the President of the Senate as the default counter. 
Yet a third possibility is that the House has the counting function for the presidency and 
the Senate has the counting function for the vice presidency.  That is because if no one has a 
majority of the electoral votes after they are counted, the House chooses the President from 
among the top vote-getters “not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President,” and 
the Senate chooses the Vice President “from the two highest numbers on the list.”  The House 
and Senate thus must have some way to determine (1) whether anyone got a majority of the 
electoral votes and, if not, (2) who were the top vote-getters.  It is not textually impossible to see 
that counting function vested in the bodies that must act (or not act in the case of an electoral 
majority) on the basis of that count, though it would be an odd provision that locates the counting 
function, sub silentio, in the very last bodies to show up in the text. 
For those who regard early practice as informative, or even dispositive, for resolving 
constitutional ambiguities: On February 6, 1789, a President of the Senate was elected “for the 
sole purpose of opening the certificates, and counting the votes of the electors of the several 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3795421
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States in the choice of a President and Vice-President of the United States . . . . ”9  The same 
thing happened on February 13, 1793 except that in 1793, the Houses of Congress each 
appointed tellers to assist the Vice President, and possibly do the actual tallying of the votes.10  
In 1789, according to the Annals of Congress, the President of the Senate opened and counted 
the electoral votes.  In 1793, the certificates were opened and read by the Vice President, serving 
as President of the Senate, and tellers appointed by the two Houses of Congress apparently 
tallied them (“ascertained the votes”) and presented the list to the Vice President who then read 
the list aloud and declared the winners of the election.11 
The early practice was thus to treat the President of the Senate (who could not be the 
Vice President in 1789 because there was not yet a Vice President) as the proper counting 
authority or at least as the supervisor of the count.  And in 1792, in the first general statute 
regulating the counting of electoral votes and specifying presidential succession (in case there is 
neither a President nor a Vice President), Congress equated the opening of the certificates, which 
the Constitution tells us is to be done by the President of the Senate, with the counting of the 
votes, on which the text of the Constitution is silent.12  We do not here endorse any particular 
answer to this vexing ambiguity regarding who counts the electoral votes.  For present purposes, 
                                                          
9   1 ANNALS OF CONG. 17 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1790). 
 
10   See 3 ANNALS  OF CONG. 874 (1793) 
 
11 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 874 (1793). 
12 See An Act relative to the Election of a President and Vice President of the United States, and declaring the 
Officer who shall act as President in case of Vacancies in the offices loth of President and Vice President, 1 Stat. 
239 (1792) (“the said certificates, or so many of them as shall have been received, shall then be opened, the votes 
counted . . ..”)  This statute remained in effect until it was repealed in 1886 by the predecessor of the current 
Electoral Count Act.  See The Electoral Count Act of 1887, Pub. L. 49–90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887). 
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we can leave that ambiguity unresolved; in 2021, we do not think that anyone was arguing about 
the math. 
The lingering question from the text of the Twelfth Amendment is what happens if there 
is a dispute over the validity of a document that purports to be a State’s electoral vote certificate 
or, as happened in 1876, multiple people claiming authority under state law provide the President 
of the Senate with competing certificates.  Sadly, the Twelfth Amendment does not say.  In what 
might seem a heresy in light of the near religious devotions many Americans have to the 
Constitution, in this regard the Constitution is defective.  This should not be seen as a serious 
criticism of the people who framed the Twelfth Amendment, for their task was necessitated by a 
defective Article II, section 1, clause 3, which failed to provide a method for separately selecting 
a President and Vice-President and resulted in the election of political enemies in one election 
and the possibility of a tie for President between a party’s presidential and vice-presidential 
candidate.13  Designing an indirect method of electing a chief executive turns out to be more 
complicated than it might initially appear. 
In our view, the only constitutionally sound answer to the lingering question is that the 
Vice-President must decide whether to include a certificate in the tally and, in the case of 
multiple certificates, select the one that in his or her opinion represents the State’s electoral 
votes.  This must be understood in light of the Twelfth Amendment’s clear command that the 
votes signed and certified by state electors “shall then be counted.”  This leaves the Vice 
President with little if any discretion, but in case of a dispute that must be resolved, in our view 
the decision falls to the Vice President as the official assigned the task of opening the certificates 
                                                          
13   See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005). 
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and presiding over the process.  Any determination by the Vice-President is then subject to 
scrutiny in federal court in a case brought by a candidate who loses the election due to the Vice-
President’s decisions.  In fact, the Vice-President’s tally even in an undisputed election is 
theoretically subject to judicial review, although in most election cycles no non-frivolous case 
could be brought. 
There are numerous reasons why neither House of Congress has any role to play in 
determining the validity of state certificates.  First, and most obviously, the text of the 
Constitution already assigns to the House and the Senate two roles: to witness the Vice-
President’s count and to elect the President and Vice-President in case no candidate garners a 
majority.  This may be the easiest application of the expressio unius canon of construction of all 
time because, as the Supreme Court emphatically recognized in the Chadha14 decision, unless 
the Constitution specifies otherwise, Congress may not take action having binding legal effect 
without presenting its decision to the President for signature or veto.  A concurrent resolution by 
Congress rejecting or accepting a particular electoral vote certificate would be a blatant violation 
of Chadha and the rather clear terms of Article I, section 7.15 
Second, the Constitution’s specification that the House votes State by State when, in 
cases of no electoral vote majority, it elects the President supports the notion that, under the 
Constitution, an ordinary vote of the House of Representatives should play no role in the 
election.  When the House elects the President, it is representing the States, not the people.  By 
                                                          
14   INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 
15   More precisely, such a resolution would have no legal effect.  Congress by concurrent resolution can say 
anything that it wishes, whether it be rejection of a state electoral certificate or a declaration of National Potato 
Month.  Without presentment, however, those words are just words. 
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design, State by State voting is much more likely to be unrepresentative16 than a vote in which 
each Member of the House has an equal vote.  For example, in recent years, one of the two major 
parties (Republican) typically has a majority in more state delegations than the other party 
(Democratic), even when there are more Democrats in the House than Republicans.   House 
Democrats often receive substantially more votes overall than their Republican counterparts.  
The constitutional design makes that irrelevant when the House selects the President, purposely 
giving the least populous States a voice equal to that of the most populous.  It is extremely 
unlikely that the Framers would have carefully constructed this unrepresentative system while, at 
the same time, allowing an ordinary vote in the House of Representatives to determine the 
outcome of the election, albeit through a different procedure. 
Third, congressional assumption of a role in the electoral vote count would be structurally 
inconsistent with the method of presidential election specified in the Constitution.  The 
Constitution assigns to each state legislature the authority to determine how to select its electors.  
At present, all States employ elections, in which eligible voters indicate their presidential 
preference, which results in the election of state electors pledged to the winning candidates.  
States also have freedom to choose between a winner-take-all system in which the winning 
candidate receives all of the State’s electoral votes and other reasonable systems such as 
allocating electoral votes proportionally or according to a geographic distribution such as by 
                                                          
16   Lawson is prepared to go along with the use of the word “unrepresentative” in this context because it is standard 
terminology.  He points out, however, that it assumes that population-based representation is the default position, so 
that forms of representation based on geography, interests, economics, or anything other than numbers are, by 
definition, “unrepresentative.”  He thinks that is mistaken; one is choosing among forms of representation rather 
than choosing between representation and something else, and he sees neither a constitutional nor a normative case 
for automatically favoring numbers over all other competing notions of representation.  See Gary Lawson, No 
History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1551, 1567 n.51 (2012).  But Lawson is a crackpot, so the hypothetical joint author known as “Beermann & 
Lawson” will squelch that Lawson joker for the time being. 
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congressional district.  But that is not the only permissible system.  It might be done directly by 
the state legislature, with or without presentment to the state governor.  It might be done by 
statewide convention or in local caucuses. 
Importantly, the Constitution does not specify a process for resolving disputes over the 
selection of electors.  The most reasonable inference from this silence is that it is up to each State 
to resolve any such disputes regarding its electors, subject only to two requirements, that electors 
are selected “as the [State] Legislature thereof may direct”17 and that the selection be done on 
time, i.e. quickly enough for the certificate to be in the possession of the Vice-President when he 
or she conducts the tally of votes in the presence of Congress.  We recognize that constitutional 
silence might leave the door open, even if just a crack, to federal legislation specifying a process 
for resolving such disputes, but even if this is so, we remain firm in our belief that Congress 
itself may play no role in the process of dispute resolution.   
In sum, the Constitution does not assign to Congress any role in the process of 
ascertaining the winner in the tally of electoral votes (beyond a textually conceivable, though 
unlikely, role as a ministerial tabulator).What this means in light of the recent controversy over 
the 2020 election is that although the Constitution left him no discretion to reject electoral vote 
certificates provided by state electors, Vice-President Mike Pence was the only appropriate 
federal target of efforts to invalidate electoral vote certificates in disputed states. 
Are we happy with our interpretation of the Constitution, that the President of the Senate 
(usually the Vice-President) has the power, subject only to potential judicial review, to determine 
which electoral votes to count?  It is, of course, an enormous power to place in one person’s 
                                                          
17 As explained below, we believe that the State Legislature must construct the dispute resolution procedure. 
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hands, but, as we have observed, the Constitution requires the counting of certificates provided 
by state electors, leaving the Vice President no discretion in the matter.  Further, if past 
performance is indicative of future results, we are reassured by the fact that even in the most 
contentious transitions, the system has accomplished the goal of electing a President based on an 
accurate tally of the electoral votes transmitted by the states.18  Only twice, both long ago, in 
1801 and again, in 1877, has the system produced serious doubts over whether the correct votes 
were counted.  In 1801. Vice President Thomas Jefferson allegedly “counted himself into the 
presidency” by including the votes represented by a facially defective certificate from Georgia 
that placed him in a tie with Aaron Burr (both receiving a majority of the total with each elector 
casting two votes) for the presidency resulting in a two-person runoff in the House of 
Representatives which Jefferson eventually won.  Had Georgia’s votes not been counted, the top 
five candidates receiving electoral votes would have been candidates in the House, which may 
have selected another candidate, less objectionable to those opposed to Jefferson.19  In 1877, 
Congress wrested the determination from the hands of the President of the Senate and handed it 
to a partisan commission that included ten Members of Congress.  Perhaps a better system could 
                                                          
18 It was suggested to us that perhaps the Vice President should recuse herself if she is a party in interest, for 
example a candidate for re-election or for President.  One could even make an argument that a self-interested Vice 
President constitutionally cannot act as the President of the Senate in such circumstances, by analogy to arguments 
that the Vice President cannot preside over impeachment trials of herself notwithstanding what seems like clear 
textual authority to do so.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 4-5 (2012).  At least one of us has some generalized sympathy for such arguments, based 
on the idea that the Constitution incorporates by reference background principles of fiduciary law for its authorized 
actors.  See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY 
CONSTITUTION (2017)., Unlike with impeachment, however, in the case of the Twelfth Amendment the Vice 
President is likely to be interested in the proceedings as a matter of course rather than rarely or episodically, so the 
Twelfth Amendment’s entrustment of the task to the Vice President seems like an express overriding of any 
background fiduciary rules.  We note that even in bitterly contested elections, most notably in 2021 when candidate 
for re-election Vice President Mike Pence presided over the process and in 2001 when presidential candidate Vice 
President Al Gore presided over the process, the Vice President has always counted the certificates provided by the 
States.  In 1801, the Vice President may have erred by counting a defective certificate that gave him an advantage in 
the election, see infra, but no Vice President has ever refused to count the a certificate provided by a state’s electors. 
19 See Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 
551, 566 (2004), citing U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (amended by U.S. Const. Amend. XII). 
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be devised, one that would guarantee the maximal adherence to the ideal of accurate tabulation 
of state electoral votes, but in the meanwhile, we rest assured that this aspect of the system we 
have, as we understand it, has left our electoral system “virtually spotless.” 
B. Disputes over Voter Fraud 
President Trump and his supporters made two distinct attacks on the 2020 presidential 
election: first, that Joe Biden’s victory was the result of massive vote fraud in some States and, 
second, that state officials other than the legislature changed the rules for conducting the 
election, in violation of the Constitution.  We discuss disputes related to voter fraud here; the 
issue of state deviation from legislatively-prescribed election procedures is discussed below. 
In our view, neither Congress nor a federal agency has a constitutional role to play in 
resolving disputes over voter fraud in the presidential elections, and any potential role for the 
federal courts arises only after the Vice-President conducts the tally of electoral votes. 20  We 
explain each conclusion in turn. 
The lack of a role for Congress follows directly from our preceding analysis.  The 
Constitution specifies that electors are selected “as the [State] Legislature thereof may direct.”  
This must include construction of processes for resolving disputes over the election, because 
otherwise Congress could coopt the process simply by allocating to itself or some other federal 
entity authority to resolve such disputes under standards prescribed by Congress or that entity.  
For example, imagine that Congress granted the Federal Electoral Commission power to conduct 
binding adjudications of claims alleging that a State’s electors had been chosen pursuant to a 
                                                          
20 We do not explore whether a federal court might exercise diversity jurisdiction over a case brought against state 
officials by a candidate from a different State.  Such a suit would raise numerous questions including state sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, abstention, and the political question doctrine. 
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fraudulently conducted election.  Either Congress or the Commission would have to determine 
what constitutes fraud, and one of them would have to specify the remedy for a finding of fraud.  
If a State’s electors were replaced due to a ruling by the commission, those electors would have 
been chosen as specified by Congress, not as specified by the state legislature, a clear violation 
of the Constitution.  Even more clearly, the same would be true if electors could be rejected or 
replaced by Congress itself.  In such cases, Congress’s standards for choosing electors would 
necessarily and unconstitutionally override state legislative choices concerning the selecting and 
challenging of electors.  Even if Congress claimed that it was merely applying the standards 
prescribed in state law, or if it instructed a federal agency to apply such standards, Congress 
would have seized state authority to create the method of dispute resolution and, more 
fundamentally, state control over the interpretation of the text of state statutory requirements. 
(This conclusion is elaborated below when we address state deviation from the apparent 
requirements of state election laws.) 
Perhaps even more basic than this structural argument is the notable absence of any 
enumerated congressional power to regulate the process of selecting presidential electors.  
Congress is specifically granted constitutional power to alter state rules regarding “[t]he Times, 
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,”21 but there is no 
comparable enumerated power with respect to the process for choosing presidential electors.  
And one need not adhere to a conception of the Necessary and Proper Clause22 as constraining as 
                                                          
21   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 
22   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Professor Lawson’s23 to see that there is no federal power for Congress to carry into execution in 
this context.  State legislatures are not “the Government of the United States, or . . . any 
Department or Officer thereof,” so Congress cannot pass laws for carrying into execution their 
constitutionally vested powers. 
The absence of provisions granting Congress the power to regulate presidential elections 
highlights another reason for rejecting a role for Congress in determining the validity of electoral 
votes. The Constitution created a system of separation of powers with checks and balances.  
Subjecting electoral votes to congressional supervision could eviscerate the President’s ability to 
check Congress because incumbent Presidents seeking reelection, and even first-time 
presidential candidates, would need to show sufficient loyalty to Congress to avert rejection of 
their electoral votes.  Further, although party politics may not have been anticipated by the 
Framers, in operation, the Constitution allows for the election of a President of a party other than 
the one that controls Congress.  This is often cited as a constitutional virtue by those who view 
“divided government” as a way to combat excessive governmental zeal.  Allowing Congress the 
power to reject electoral votes and send the presidential election to the House would imperil the 
voters’ ability to opt for divided government.  There are many countries in the world in which 
divided government is virtually impossible; the United States is not one of them. 
Even a simple federal statute requiring, for example, that States use paper ballots or not 
use a type or brand of voting machine subject to control by the deceased leader of a South 
American dictatorship would be unconstitutional.  The Constitution is clear.  States prescribe the 
                                                          
23   See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY 
CONSTITUTION 76-103 (2017); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
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method of selecting state electors, and absent a violation of a voting-related provision of the 
Constitution, such as the federal constitutional provisions prohibiting the denial of the vote based 
on race, sex, ability to pay a poll tax, or age of eighteen or greater,24 federal law may not alter 
state standards.25 
So how exactly are disputes over voter fraud and related challenges supposed to be 
resolved?  It’s really simple.  They are resolved however the state legislature says they are 
supposed to be resolved.  Those resolution processes – as well as the non-obvious determination 
of what constitutes fraud26 -- are part of the “Manner” of selecting electors that state legislatures 
prescribe.  The state legislature could assign such challenges to a state court, to a state agency, to 
a single state official such as the governor or the secretary of state, or to itself (or a subunit of 
itself).  If the designated forum is not a state court, it is up to the state legislature to determine 
whether a non-judicial decision on the validity of the election is subject to judicial review in state 
court.  One can question the wisdom of various choices of state legislatures in this regard, but, 
                                                          
24   See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. 
 
25 This conclusion opens a window into a complicated and open legal question of whether a more general 
constitutional standard like equal protection or due process might provide a basis for judicial or congressional 
intervention into state voting standards.  The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically its provision allowing 
for reduction of state representation in the House when a State unlawfully denies a class of persons the right to vote, 
see id. amend. XIV, § 2, indicates that they do not. This indirect supervision of state voting practices indicates that 
the Framers of the amendment did not believe that the amendment’s enforcement power provides a basis for direct 
regulation of state voting rules.  It is also conceivable that the Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government 
Clause, see id. art. IV, § 4, could authorize, and even require, federal intervention in state voting practices that are so 
egregious that they violate the norms of republicanism, though it is not clear from the provision which federal 
institutions would have what kinds of powers or responsibilities in those circumstances – and never mind what it 
might mean for institutions to be “republican.”  See STEVEN GOW CALABRESI & GARY LAWSON, THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION: CREATION, RECONSTRUCTION, THE PROGRESSIVES, AND THE MODERN ERA 77-78 (2020). 
 
26   Is it “fraud” if ballots are cast, multiple times, in the name of dead former residents of Chicago?  In the selection 
of presidential electors, that is actually up to the Illinois state legislature to decide.  Article II of the Constitution 
does not embody a Platonic conception of fraud.  Something is only fraud if it deviates from a baseline of legality, 
and the Constitution commits the specification of that baseline to state legislatures in the case of selection of 
presidential electors. 
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absent violation of a specific constitutional prohibition, one cannot question the legality of those 
choices.27 
So now let’s assume that state processes have run their course, and there is substantial 
evidence that something fishy – by the standards of the State’s own processes -- went on.  If the 
State sends a certificate that reeks of rotting aquatic life, must the Vice President include the 
votes represented by the certificate in the tally? 
Here, there is some constitutional uncertainty.  The language of the Twelfth Amendment 
says nothing other than that the Vice-President is supposed to “open all the certificates and the 
votes shall then be counted.”  It may be that this leaves the Vice-President no choice but to open 
and count all certificates purporting to have been provided by the State’s electors,28 even if it is 
widely known, for example, that the candidate named in the certificate did not receive a single 
lawful vote in the State.29  This is what Vesan Kesavan calls a “thin” conception of counting, in 
which counting is a ministerial function with no element of judgment.30  The language of the 
Twelfth Amendment (“the votes shall then be counted”) certainly supports this reading.  There is 
                                                          
27   Could any of those constitutional prohibitions be implicit rather than explicit?  That depends on one’s theory of 
constitutional interpretation.  (And even the most ardent of textualists will often recognize some implicit provisions, 
such as fiduciary background rules.)  The point here is only that there needs to be some constitutional norm outside 
Article II, section 1 on which to ground any legal challenge. 
 
28   See Kesavan, supra note --, at n. 220 (so arguing with respect to opening of certificates). 
 
29 This could happen if the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact went into effect through enactment by a 
sufficient number of States (and approval by Congress if it is considered the sort of compact that Congress must 
approve), and the candidate receiving the most popular votes did not qualify to appear on the ballot in a state that 
had compacting states.  See National Popular Vote, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation, last 
visited February 28, 2021.  States adopting that proposal would agree to cast their electoral votes for the winner of 
the national popular vote regardless of the outcome of the election in their own State.  By its terms, the compact 
would become effective only if States representing a majority of electoral votes had passed it.  Interestingly, the 
compact might be effective for one or two elections and then go out of effect if the distribution of electoral votes 
pursuant to the decennial census deprives the compacting states of a previously-held majority of electoral votes.  
 
30   See Kesavan, supra note --, at 1712-13. 
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also, however, a credible constitutional argument for a “thicker” conception of counting under 
which the Vice-President has the unilateral authority to decline to include a certificate – or 
purported certificate that does not meet some objective constitutional criterion for being a 
legitimate “certificate” – in the count.31  Support for this argument lies in the possibility the 
Vice-President might receive more than one certificate purporting to be genuine and authoritative 
from a State in which its own authorities did not resolve the dispute or in which two different 
resolutions were arrived at by competing state authorities.  Far-fetched?  No more far-fetched 
than the prospect of two (or conceivably more) sets of forces both claiming to be the legitimate 
government of a State.32  Recall that in the 1876 election, the President of the Senate received 
multiple electoral vote certificates from persons claiming to be the legitimate authorities from the 
States of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina.  In such circumstances, someone has to decide 
which (if any) certificates to count, and in our view, the only likely candidate for this task is the 
Vice-President.  As described above, Congress cannot perform this function.  Perhaps the House, 
voting State by State, could perform that function for the President and the Senate could perform 
it for the Vice President, but that requires several textual leaps beyond simply folding the 
function into the President of the Senate’s duty to open “certificates” coming from “Electors” but 
only “certificates” coming from “Electors.” It would be impossible to have a rule that in a State 
providing multiple certificates, no certificate may be counted, because that would give each 
political party or faction an easy method of nullifying the States’ votes.  Moving along, if the 
Vice-President has the authority to choose among competing certificates (or, viewed another 
way, among competing claimed “Electors”), then he or she might also have the power to reject a 
                                                          
31   See Harrison, supra note 1, at 703. 
 
32   See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
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certificate for some other reason, such as evidence of voter fraud or, perhaps, a State’s failure to 
comply with its own election laws, on the rationale that documents coming from people who 
claim to be “Electors” are not from the real, constitutionally valid “Electors” mentioned in the 
Twelfth Amendment. 
Would the Vice-President’s power to select among competing certificates/electors or to 
reject a certificate for some other reason be final and conclusive? We think not.  In our view, the 
Vice-President’s actions would be subject to challenge in federal court on the ground that his or 
her rejection of a certificate was illegal or not supported by the facts.  The grounds for challenge 
would be confined to federal law and would depend on the Vice-President’s grounds for 
rejecting the certificate.  For example, if the Vice-President determines that a certificate from a 
State had not been actually sent by the States’ electors, the court would have authority to review 
the facts to determine whether that was true.  This determination might require an inquiry into 
state law, because the purported electors who sent the certificate likely had some legal basis for 
their belief that they were the electors vested with authority to cast votes for President; a 
certificate sent by a persons or persons other than the state’s electors would be of no effect under 
the Twelfth Amendment. 
What would happen if the Vice President rejected a certificate based on his or her 
conclusion that the State’s election was infected by fraud?  In our view, for reasons described 
above, this would not be proper legal grounds for rejection: disputes over the conduct of a State’s 
election must be resolved on state law grounds and pursuant to the method specified by the state 
legislature.  The Vice-President has no constitutional authority to impose standards of conduct on 
State-administered selection procedures for electors.  Unless the Vice-President identifies a 
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violation of federal law, or determines that a certificate was not provided by a State’s electors, all 
votes contained in the certificates must be counted. 
We recognize that the federal courts might be reluctant to get involved in what is likely to 
be a politically charged controversy over the Vice-President’s administration of the Twelfth 
Amendment.  It is even conceivable that the Supreme Court would decide, contrary to our view, 
that the Vice-President’s actions are not subject to judicial review, perhaps based on the political 
question doctrine or on a theory of equitable discretion.  We note, however, that many of 
President Obama’s and President Trump’s most controversial actions have been subjected to 
federal court review, including many in the highly-charged immigration context, this despite the 
Supreme Court’s determination that the President is not an agency subject to review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.33  It would seem inconsistent with the theory of separation of 
powers and with checks and balances to shield the Vice-President’s electoral vote decisions from 
judicial review, especially when it is clear that Congress has no role to play in the matter.34  And 
even if we are incorrect, and the federal courts would not review the Vice President’s 
determinations over the validity of state electoral vote certificates, the mandatory nature of the 
Twelfth Amendment’s command that the votes “shall then be counted” and the tradition of Vice 
Presidents’ adherence to their constitutional duty, should be comforting to anyone concerned 
over this.  
                                                          
33   See Dalton v. Spencer, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992). 
 
34   Lawson, for his part, is dubious that the Supreme Court has the power, under whatever label, to refuse to decide 
a case within its enumerated constitutional jurisdiction just because a bunch of justices think it is too touchy.  But 
see note ---, supra (explaining “Beermann & Lawson’s” general attitude towards that Lawson fellow). 
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In sum, disputes over the conduct of the election may be resolved only as specified by the 
state legislature.  Congress most likely has no constitutional role in the process of counting 
electoral votes, and all certificates transmitted to the President of the Senate must be included in 
the count unless the Vice-President concludes that a certificate was not transmitted by a State’s 
electors or that it is invalid due to some other violation of federal law.  The Vice-President’s 
decisions concerning the validity of the certificates is subject to challenge in federal court, but 
judicial review must be narrowly focused on whether, under the facts and the law, federal law 
has been violated.  The federal courts should not allow the Vice-President to reject certificates 
based on findings of election fraud or illegal voting without evidence of a violation of one of the 
federal constitutional requirements governing the election, such as the requirement that electors 
be chosen as specified by the state legislature or that the document reporting the State’s results 
be signed and certified by the State’s electors and transmitted by them to the President of the 
Senate. 
While some of the conclusions that we have just reached are subject to reasonable 
dispute, some are not.  That, of course, does not prevent Congress from reaching unreasonable 
conclusions.  And Congress, true to form, has not disappointed.  We now turn to an examination 
of the Electoral Count Act, which represents Congress’s construction of its role under the 
Twelfth Amendment. 
II. The Electoral Count Act 
In the disputed election of 1876, Democratic Party candidate Samuel Tilden received 184 
undisputed electoral votes, one short of the required 185 to be elected President.  Republican 
Rutherford B. Hayes received 165 undisputed votes, and 20 votes were disputed.  Nineteen of 
those votes represented Florida, South Carolina and Louisiana, where multiple certificates had 
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been transmitted to the President of the Senate, and one vote, from Oregon, was disputed because 
the State governor’s replaced a Republican elector who had been ruled ineligible to serve with a 
Democrat.  Tilden needed to win only one of the disputed electoral votes to become President, 
while Hayes needed all twenty. 
Congress legislatively established a commission to resolve the dispute.  The fifteen-
member commission, composed of Members of Congress and Supreme Court Justices, was 
supposed to include seven Republicans and seven Democrats with independent Supreme Court 
Justice David Davis of Illinois presumed to be holding the deciding vote.  While the commission 
was being put together, the Republican-controlled Illinois legislature, in order to engineer a 
Republican majority, elected Davis to the United States Senate, which left only Republicans on 
the Supreme Court to fill the fifteenth seat.  This resulted in 8-7 votes in favor of Hayes with 
regard to every disputed electoral vote, making Tilden the only candidate in U.S. history to win a 
majority of the popular vote and not become President. 
It took Congress until 1887 to craft and pass a general statute, the Electoral Count Act,35 
to provide a method for resolving disputes like the one that occurred in 1876.  The Act as 
presently codified, in large part, tracks the requirements of the Constitution, such as stating how 
many electors each State is entitled to appoint36 and that after they vote, the electors must sign 
and certify the certificate and send a copy thereof to the President of the Senate.37  The Act also 
                                                          
35   Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373.  The modern version was codified as part of the enactment of Title 3 of 
the United States Code into positive law.  See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, 62 Stat. 672 (codified at 3 U.S.C.). 
 
36   See 3 U.S.C. § 3 (2018). 
 
37   See id. §§ 9-10. 
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specifies the date of the election38 and the time for the meeting of the electors,39 both of which 
Congress is authorized to set by Article II of the Constitution.40  However, some of the Act’s 
provisions go well beyond the Constitution and, in some cases, may contradict constitutional 
requirements.  Before arguing that parts of the Act are unconstitutional, we first explain how the 
Act’s process for objecting to electoral votes was misapplied on January 6, 2021. 
The Act’s central provision41 tracks the procedure adopted in the 1877 Electoral 
Commission Act, except that it omits the provision creating a federal commission to resolve 
disputes over States that transmit more than one certificate.  The Act specifies that after the Vice-
President opens each State’s certificate and announces the State’s votes, he or she “shall call for 
objections, if any.”  Then, if an objection is made in writing and signed by at least one Member 
of the House and one Member of the Senate, the House and Senate shall separately debate and 
vote on the objection, and if both Houses vote in favor of the objection, the electoral votes from 
that State shall not be counted.  Vice-President Pence scrupulously followed that process, but he, 
and the Members of Congress generally, ignored the Act’s substantive limitation of objections, 
that “no electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have been regularly given by electors 
whose appointment has been lawfully certified to according to section 6 of this title [U.S. Code 
Title 3] from which but one return has been received shall be rejected, but the two Houses 
concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that such vote or votes have not been 
so regularly given by electors whose appointment has been so certified.”  In other words, any 
                                                          
38   See id. § 1. 
 
39   See id. § 7. 
 
40   U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 
41   See 3 U.S.C. § 15. 
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objections that Congress may legally make to electoral vote certificates must concern whether 
the certifying authority of the State complied with section 6. 
The relevant requirements of section 6 are three: the communication of the identities of 
the electors by the State’s executive authority to the National Archivist, inclusion in the list of 
electors the vote totals underlying their selection, and, in case a dispute arose concerning the 
identities of a State’s electors (presumably including a dispute over the outcome of the election), 
certification by the State executive of the result of the dispute.42  The objections by Members of 
Congress to the electoral vote count on January 6, 2021 were based on vote fraud and alleged 
failure of States to adhere to state election procedures are thus are not contemplated by the text 
of the Electoral Count Act.  Acceptance of those objections by a majority in Congress would 
thus have been statutorily unlawful, in addition to an unconstitutional usurpation of the Vice-
President’s role in the electoral vote count. 
While the language of section 15 is turgid, our view that fraud and other state election 
irregularities are not statutory bases for objecting to electoral vote certificates is supported by the 
history of the 1876-1877 dispute that inspired the Act.43  The Electoral Commission that 
Congress established to resolve the disputes over the 1876 election refused, over strenuous 
objections by the lawyers for Democratic Candidate Samuel Tilden and by party-line vote, to 
look behind the certificates provided by the governors of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina. 
Instead, although it allowed Tilden’s lawyers to present evidence of election fraud and 
intimidation, it viewed its task as confined to determining which certificates had been provided 
                                                          
42   See id. § 6. 
 
43   For a detailed account of that history, see Colvin & Foley, supra note --. 
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by the legitimate governor of each of the States.  Once the commission decided that the governor 
in each of the disputed States was the Republican, the commission concluded, again by party-line 
vote, that it would award the disputed States’ electoral votes to Hayes as specified in the 
certificates forwarded by the electors identified by the Republican governors. 
The commission did, however deviate from this practice with regard to Oregon.  In 
Oregon, the Democratic governor had replaced an ineligible Republican elector with a Democrat, 
thus potentially awarding one of the State’s electoral votes to Tilden despite Hayes having 
indisputably won the Oregon election.  In this case, the commission peeked behind the certificate 
and decided that the Democratic governor could not replace the Republican elector with a 
Democrat even though the governor had acted in accord with the requirements of State law.  This 
provoked a strong dissent from a Democratic member of the commission, which confirms that 
with regard to the other States, the commission did not look behind the certificates: 
By a vote of eight to seven, this Commission has decided on purely 
technical grounds that Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina voted for Hayes, and 
by the same vote of the same members have, as I think, discarded these very same 
technical grounds to give the one disputed vote of Oregon to Hayes.  I say this 
Commission has disappointed public expectation because the country expected of 
it that it would decide who had been elected President and Vice-President by the 
people.  They did not expect of us that we would merely confirm the judgment of 
corrupt and illegal returning-boards who in effect put the presidency up to the 
highest bidder in the public market.44 
                                                          
44 See GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, THE ELECTORAL COUNT OF 1877: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELECTORAL 
COMMISSION AND OF THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS IN JOINT MEETING RELATIVE TO THE COUNT OF ELECTORAL 
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Because the current Electoral Count Act does not provide a legal basis for overruling the 
Vice-President’s decision to count the electoral votes from Arizona and Pennsylvania, the 
objections should not have been entertained.  Ordinarily, it might make sense to allow a pointless 
debate to go forward, if only to allow Members of Congress with strong feelings to have their 
say. In fact, many debates in Congress appear to us to be pointless.  But on January 6, the delay 
served to give aggressive members of the mob outside the Capitol Building time to stage their 
attempt to prevent the electoral vote tally from going forward, presumably to pave the way for a 
reversal of the election and, in effect, a coup.45  The process should have been over in a half 
hour, and the Members of Congress might have escaped before the mob forced them to shelter in 
confined quarters with colleagues who, by refusing to wear masks, likely exposed them to the 
COVID-19 virus. 
Of course, even if the Act had purported to allow Members of Congress to cancel out a 
State’s electoral votes based on concerns about the State’s selection process, it would be 
unconstitutional, for reasons that we have elaborated above.  Congress’s attempt, in the Act to 
give itself a role in resolving disputes over electoral votes is perhaps the best example of 
Madison’s prediction in Federalist 48 that “[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending 
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”  Just as the Supreme 
                                                          
VOTES CAST DECEMBER 6, 1876 FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM COMMENCING MARCH 4, 1877 at 929-30 (1877) 
(statement of Commissioner Eppa Hunton).. 
 
45   Does the phrase “pave the way for a reversal of the election and, in effect, a coup” mean that reversal of the 
election would amount to, in effect, a coup, or does it mean that stopping the allegedly unlawful electoral tally 
would pave the way for reversal of an election that was itself, in effect, a coup?  Is it a blue and black dress or a 
white and gold dress?  And, of course, the protestors may have had no ambitions of actually changing the electoral 
outcome.  Sometimes protestors just gotta protest, and sometimes rioters just gotta riot.  To be sure, there were 
probably not a lot of big-screen TVs to be lifted from the Capitol, so, as riots go, this one promised to be less 
remunerative than some others, but since neither of us has ever been part of a riot, we are not well equipped to 
analyze the motives of those who have. 
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Court turned away Congress’s attempt to appoint members to the Federal Election Commission 
(because the Appointments Clause prescribes only a limited congressional role -- Senate 
confirmation -- in the process),46 the Court should, in a proper case, reject the Act’s provisions 
enabling Congress to supervise the counting of electoral votes and confine Congress to its 
constitutionally-prescribed role of electing the President and Vice-President in case no candidate 
receives a majority of electoral votes. 
The Electoral Count Act contains additional constitutional infirmities.  Before getting to 
them, we note that some of the Act’s provisions are benign and fall comfortably within 
Congress’s authority to enact laws that are “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 
the powers of the federal government. Several of the Act’s provisions simply track the 
Constitution’s requirements, such as recognizing each State’s authority to provide by law for the 
replacement of electors unable to serve.  In that respect, they are the legal equivalent of 
declarations of National Potato Month and make no change in the legal landscape.  Another 
important provision requires each State executive to transmit the names of the electors to the 
Archivist of the United States.  Under a broad view of the Necessary and Proper Clause, this 
could be seen to facilitate the Vice-President’s verification of the authenticity of the certificates 
transmitted by the electors themselves and thus is vital to the execution of the Twelfth 
Amendment.  A narrower view of the Necessary and Proper Clause sees that clause only as an 
authorization to allow Congress to help federal actors who are otherwise granted power to 
execute their own functions, not as authority to regulate non-federal actors to make the life of 
federal actors easier or to make the exercise of federal power more effective.  Modern doctrine 
                                                          
46 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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supports the former interpretation, but the matter is not entirely free from controversy.47  And the 
Act conveniently provides that the electoral votes will be counted by the President of the Senate 
on January 6 following the election, which plainly concerns the exercise of functions vested by 
the Constitution in a federal official and is thus easily constitutional. 
Other provisions of the Act raise serious constitutional questions.  We address two: 
section 5 of the Act provides that only state laws enacted prior to the election may conclusively 
determine disputes over the appointment of the electors and only if the results of the dispute are 
made at least six days prior to the time of the meeting of the electors.48  This provision implies 
that state legislative enactments made after the election are not binding on the federal authorities 
engaged in the count of the electoral votes.  In our view, disregarding state laws passed after the 
election would violate Article II’s specification that States appoint their electors “in such Manner 
as the Legislature thereof may direct.”  And disregarding state dispute resolutions communicated 
less than six days prior to the meeting of the electors would unconstitutionally usurp state 
authority over the appointment of electors, because the implication is that some federal authority 
(Congress?  The Vice-President?) would have power to resolve the dispute simply because the 
state dispute resolution process took a few days too long for Congress’s tastes.  In our view, this 
is absurd.  Of course, if a State fails to appoint electors, the State’s voters lose their voice in 
                                                          
47   See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 874-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (taking the 
narrower view with respect to execution of the federal treaty power); CALABRESI & LAWSON, supra note --, at 841-
42. 
 
48   See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2018) (“If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the 
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of 
all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have 
been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant 
to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be 
conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter 
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned.”). 
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selecting the President and Vice-President.  That would be a shame (unless, perhaps, one does 
not like the way that the State’s electors were going to vote), but it would be consistent with the 
constitutional structure. 
III. Unconstitutional Elections 
In order to be constitutionally eligible to cast votes for President and Vice President, 
electors must be chosen “in such Manner as the Legislature” of their State directs.  How does a 
state legislature indicate that “Manner”?  How do the federal officials responsible for counting 
the electoral votes determine whether people who claim to be electors really have that status? 
Start with the first question.  Interestingly, Article II of the Constitution does not specify 
any particular form through which state legislatures must express their chosen selection 
procedures.  There are numerous additional references in the United States Constitution to action 
by state legislatures, such as selection of United States Senators,49 ratification of constitutional 
amendments50 and consent to the formation of a new state that includes an existing state’s 
territory51 and none of these references specifies the method by which the state legislature must 
act including whether these actions are subject to veto by the state executive.  By contrast, the 
Constitution often, but not always, specifies how Congress must act: for example, money can 
only be drawn from the federal treasury pursuant to appropriations made “by law,”52 federal 
                                                          
49 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (superseded by U.S. Const. Amend. XVII.  It appears that state governors were not 
involved in this process.  See Wendy J. Schiller, Charles Stewart III & Benjamin Xiong, U.S. Senate Elections 
before the 17th Amendment: Political Party Cohesion and Conflict 1871–1913, 75 J. Pol. 835, 836-37 (2013). 
 
50 U.S. Const. art. V, § 1. 
 
51 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2. 
52   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
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offices must be “established by Law,”53 and Congress can alter state rules for federal elections 
“by Law.”54  Lawmaking, in turn, must follow the bicameral and presentment procedures laid 
down in Article I, section 7.  On other occasions, the Constitution is less specific; each House, 
for example, “may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,”55 but the Constitution says nothing 
about how the House and Senate must go about establishing those rules.  Each House also gets to 
“chuse” its officers (other than the constitutional specification of the Vice President as the 
President of the Senate),56 again with no specification of the method by which that must happen.  
The default rule, of course, is majority rule within each body,57 but if the majority chooses some 
method other than majority rule (perhaps picking the Speaker of the House by lottery), there is 
nothing legally invalid about following that procedure in a given case (though presumably the 
majority could change that procedure if it felt like it).  If the Constitution demanded that the 
Speaker of the House, for instance, could be selected only by a vote of all of the Members, it 
would have been as easy to say so as it was to say that Congress can only act in specified ways 
“by Law.”  Article II is similarly silent about the means by which state legislatures establish the 
method for selection of electors.  Perhaps they could do it by statutes, in accordance with their 
state constitutional procedures for enacting statutes.  Perhaps they could do it by a resolution that 
bypasses any state requirements of presentment to the governor.  Article II does not say that state 
                                                          
53   Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
54   Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 
55   Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 
56   Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 5. 
 
57   See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICAN’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE 
BY 56-63, 356-69 (2012). 
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electors will be selected “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct by law.”  Those 
last two words are conspicuously absent. 
As it happens, state legislatures typically put their selection procedures in the form of 
statutes.  That is certainly their right under the Constitution.  The only constitutional constraints 
on the substance of those selection procedures come from provisions limiting the ability of States 
to deny certain persons the right to vote if States choose to use voting as the means for selecting 
electors and whatever constraints flow from the Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government 
Clause, which might forbid, for example, allowing elector status to be hereditary. 
Once those state legislatures’ procedures (“Manner[s]”) for choosing electors are in 
place, those state procedures acquire federal constitutional status.  Only electors chosen in 
accordance with state legislatively prescribed procedures are the “Electors” mentioned in the 
Twelfth Amendment whose votes count towards election of the President and Vice President. 
This basic fact is the foundation for many of the challenges arising from the 2020 
election.  In a number of States, voting rules were seemingly altered by executive and judicial 
officials.  As claimed by the State of Texas in a motion for leave to file in the United States 
Supreme Court (which was denied by the Court for lack of standing58): 
Using  the  COVID-19 pandemic  as  a  justification,  government  
officials  in the   defendant   states   of   Georgia,   Michigan,   and Wisconsin,  
and  the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania (collectively,  “Defendant  States”),  
usurped  their legislatures’ authority and unconstitutionally revised their  state’s  
                                                          
58   See Texas v. Pennsylvania, -- S.Ct. – (2020). 
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election  statutes.  They accomplished these  statutory  revisions  through  
executive fiat  or friendly lawsuits, thereby weakening ballot integrity. 
. . .  
By  purporting  to  waive  or  otherwise modify  the  existing  state  law  in  
a  manner  that  was wholly ultra  vires and not adopted by each state’s legislature,  
Defendant  States  violated  not  only  the Electors Clause, U.S. CONST..art. II, § 
1, cl. 2, 59 
Assume for the moment that election procedures in at least some of the instances detailed in the 
Texas complaint were inconsistent with what appears to be the plain language of relevant state 
statutes in the named jurisdictions.  Does that mean that electors in those States were 
unconstitutionally chosen in a manner different from the one prescribed by the state legislatures? 
The short answer is “We dunno,” and we suspect that no one else really knows either.  
The underlying legal question is how one ascertains the directions issued by the state legislatures 
in these instances.  One way to ascertain those directions, of course, is to read the plain meaning 
of the statutes.  As anyone moderately familiar with American law can attest, however, that is 
hardly the only means by which statutory language and legal instructions get matched up.60  If 
that was not so, law school Legislation and Administrative Law courses would be much shorter 
and more boring.  Could it be the case, for instance, that the best way to ascertain the instructions 
for selecting electors prescribed by the Pennsylvania legislator is to look to see what would best 
                                                          
59   https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/22/22O155/162953/20201207234611533_TX-v-State-Motion-2020-
12-07%20FINAL.pdf, at 1, 14. 
 
60   See LINDA JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2013). 
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promote the widest possible scope for voting in the face of unusual conditions, even at the 
potential cost of a measure of ballot security?  How would one determine whether that is the 
case?  A devotee of plain meaning would answer: “By reading the statutes, dummy.”  But has the 
Pennsylvania legislature directed that its statutes regarding the selection of electors are supposed 
to be read strictly in accordance with their plain meaning? 
Put another way: Is there anything in the United States Constitution that dictates to the 
States how state statutes governing the selection of presidential electors must be written, 
construed, or applied?  That would seem to be a matter for each State to decide for itself.  If, for 
instance, the Pennsylvania legislature had appended to its election laws a proviso that said, “In 
construing these statutes, give paramount weight to making it as easy as possible for the 
maximum number of people to cast ballots when there are health risks from appearing in person, 
even if that means that a number of ‘fraudulent’ ballots get counted,” is there any imaginable 
constitutional problem with that?  We can’t see it.  And if that is implicitly the best account of the 
“Manner” by which the Pennsylvania legislature meant for electors to be chosen, then the state 
executive and judicial officials may have gotten it “right.”  Indeed, it is possible that implicit in 
the Pennsylvania statutory scheme is a proviso saying that whatever certain executive officials 
think is a good idea trumps statutory language.  That may be an unwise scheme of statutory 
interpretation, but we cannot see how it could be unconstitutional. 
A failure to appreciate that state legislatures determine all aspects of the “Manner” in 
which electors are chosen, including the interpretative principles necessary to ascertain that 
“Manner,” was evident in 2000-01 in Bush v. Gore.61  For the young ‘uns who are not old 
                                                          
61   531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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enough to remember these events: The 2000 presidential election between George W .Bush and 
Al Gore came down to a few hundred ballots in Florida whose legality – and, in some cases, 
content where it was unclear whether a vote had been cast at all and for whom – was hotly 
disputed.  The Florida Supreme Court, by a sharply divided vote, construed several sections of its 
State’s election code involving such matters as deadlines for certifications, review of the 
decisions of canvassing boards, and the definition of “legal votes” under Florida law in a fashion 
that seemed to favor the electoral prospects of Gore, including by ordering a manual count of 
certain alleged votes in some but not all Florida counties.62  A seven-Justice majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the lack of uniform standards prescribed for these manual counts 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it could lead to ballots 
from different voters in the State being assessed under different standards.63  (The Court divided 
5-4 over the remedy for this claimed constitutional violation.64)   
While we both doubt whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is a 
plausible source of principles governing the counting of state votes,65 the real action for this 
essay came in a three- Justice concurrence authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist.  The 
concurrence said that an additional ground for reversing the Florida Supreme Court, in addition 
to the equal protection problem, was that the Florida court’s interpretation of the relevant state 
                                                          
62   See Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). 
 
63   See 531 U.S. at 109. 
 
64   See id. at 111; id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 
65   To be fair to the Court in Bush v. Gore: The idea that equal protection principles govern state voting comes from 
the so-called “reapportionment cases,” most notably Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and has been a fixture of American constitutional law for 
more than half a century.  While any or all of these cases might have been correctly decided under either the 
Guarantee Clause or general fiduciary principles, the Equal Protection Clause is, at first glance, an unlikely doctrinal 
hook.  
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statutes “departs from the provisions enacted by the Florida Legislature,”66 “plainly departed 
from the legislative scheme,”67 and was even “absurd.”68  While federal courts normally defer 
entirely to interpretations of state law by the State’s highest court,69 the Bush v. Gore 
concurrence maintained that Article II, section 1 makes state-law determinations in the selection 
of presidential electors a uniquely federal issue on which the federal courts are free to second-
guess state court determinations.70  Even if that is so, and federal courts must make a de novo 
interpretation of the relevant state election laws when dealing with disputes about presidential 
elections, the concurrence took for granted that state statutes mean what their plain meaning 
prescribes.  If that is true, then the concurrence had a real point: at least some of the 
interpretations advanced by the Florida courts were, if not “absurd,” then at least strained from 
the standpoint of plain-meaning textualist interpretation.  But was that the right way to read 
Florida’s election laws?  Maybe.  We don’t know.  Neither, we suspect, did the concurring 
Justices, since there was nothing in the opinion exploring in detail the norms of interpretation 
governing in Florida, either in 2000 or (perhaps more to the point?) when the various election 
                                                          
66   531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 
67   Id. 
 
68   Id. at 119. 
 
69   The origins of this doctrine are actually quite peculiar, but that is also a story for another time.  See GARY 
LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, DEFERENCE: THE LEGAL CONCEPT AND THE LEGAL PRACTICE 55-58 (2017). 
 
70   See 531 U.S. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  We note that three current members of the Supreme Court 
may have recently endorsed a federal requirement that state courts, and presumably all state officials, adhere to a 
plain meaning interpretation and application of state statutory requirements for selecting presidential electors.  See 
Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. DeGraffenreid, no. 20-542; Corman v. Pennsylvania Dmocratic Party, no. 20-
574 (Feb. 22, 2021) (Thomas J, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, slip op. at 4-5); Alito, J. joined by Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari, slip op. at 1-2)  The Pennsylvania case contains the additional wrinkle 
that the state supreme court endorsed the departure from plain statutory language with reference to a constitutional 
requirement that elections be “free and equal,” raising the possibility that federal court rejection of a state supreme 
court’s ruling might compel state officials to violate their own state’s constitution in order to comply with federal 
law.  Id. at 1, citing Pennsylvania Democratic Party v. Boockvar, ___ Pa. ___, ___–___, 238 A. 3d 345, 369–372 
(2020) and Pennsylvania Constitution, Art I, § 5. 
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statutes were enacted.  That ascertainment of the correct interpretative norms is a necessary first 
step for determining the “Manner” by which a state legislature has fixed the process for choosing 
its State’s electors. 
To return to 2020: Did the Pennsylvania legislature direct, explicitly or implicitly, that its 
instructions for choosing presidential electors be understood in  any “Manner” that would not 
give decisive weight to the plain meaning of statutory enactments?  We do not know.  This is a 
quickie essay, not a detailed research piece. Nor have we looked carefully at the methods, 
traditions, and understandings that might determine the meaning of instructions given by 
legislatures in Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, or other States.  Quite possibly, one could get very 
different answers in each of those States. 
Our best guess is that Vice President Pence did not know the answers to any of these 
state-law questions on January 6, 2021 either.  (Neither, we strongly suspect, do the army of 
academics proclaiming Texas’s challenges to the voting practices in those States to be “baseless” 
or “conspiracy theories.”  Maybe those challenges are both of those things, but such a 
determination would require a careful legal analysis for which few academics probably have the 
expertise or stomach.)  Did he need to have those answers? 
One possible path to “no” is simply to observe that if there is no controversy coming from 
a particular State’s legislature about the validity of that State’s certification, there is probably 
nothing for the Vice President, or the federal courts, to decide.  If the State’s legislature is happy 
with the certification, perhaps evidenced only by silence regarding the validity of the certificate 
provided by the electors, why isn’t that conclusive proof that the electors were selected in the 
manner directed by that body?  In that sense, the Supreme Court was correct to dismiss Texas’s 
attempt to challenge the voting practices in other States – not because of Article III standing 
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(which we both acknowledge might be an entirely bogus doctrine, though that is a topic for 
another day) but because, on the merits, the state legislatures appear to have spoken. 
A more difficult question would be posed if members of a state legislature object that the 
State’s purported certification of electoral votes is not the product of electors chosen in the 
manner directed by the legislature.  In that circumstance, the Vice President probably does have 
to determine whether the document before him or her really is a “certificate” representing the 
votes of “Electors” chosen in the proper manner.  That is unlikely to be something that can be 
determined in half an hour – or seven hours, or even several days.  That is a very difficult, 
involved, complex matter of both fact and law.  The Vice President is not necessarily going to be 
the best person to engage in that inquiry.  But that is the person to whom the Constitution seems 
to commit the matter in the first instance. 
All of which just serves as a reminder that the Constitution is what it is: A patchwork of 
provisions put together, across time, by eminently fallible humans.  One does not expect 
congressional statutes to be exemplars of human wisdom and consistency.  It is not obvious why 
one would expect more from the Constitution.  See the Twelfth Amendment. 
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